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Abstract	
The	Model	Criminal	Code	(MCC)	was	intended	to	be	a	Code	for	all	Australian	jurisdictions.	It	
represents	a	high	point	of	faith	in	the	value	and	possibility	of	systematising,	rationalising	
and	modernising	criminal	law.	The	core	of	the	MCC	is	Chapter	2,	the	‘general	principles	of	
criminal	 responsibility’,	 which	 outlines	 the	 ‘physical’	 and	 ‘fault’	 elements	 of	 criminal	
offences,	 and	 defines	 concepts	 such	 as	 recklessness.	 This	 paper	 assesses	 the	 MCC	 as	 a	
criminal	law	reform	project	and	explores	questions	of	how	the	MCC	came	into	being,	and	
why	 it	 took	 shape	 in	 certain	ways	at	a	 particular	point	 in	 time.	The	paper	 tackles	 these	
questions	 from	 two	different	 perspectives—‘external’	 and	 ‘internal’	 (looking	 at	 the	MCC	
from	the	‘outside’	and	the	‘inside’).	I	make	two	main	arguments.	First,	I	argue	that,	driven	
by	a	 ‘top	down’	 law	reform	process,	 the	MCC	came	into	being	at	a	time	when	changes	in	
crime	and	criminal	justice	were	occurring,	and	that	it	may	be	understood	as	an	attempt	to	
achieve	stability	in	a	time	of	change.	Second,	I	argue	that	the	significance	of	the	principles	
of	criminal	responsibility,	which	formed	the	central	pivot	of	the	MCC,	lies	on	the	conceptual	
level—in	 relation	 to	 the	 language	 through	 which	 the	 criminal	 law	 is	 thought	 about,	
organised	and	reformed.	
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Introduction	
The	 Commonwealth	Model	 Criminal	 Code	 (MCC)	 (Parliamentary	 Counsel’s	 Committee	 2009),	
which	 was	 developed	 in	 the	 early	 1990s,	 signalled	 a	 particular	 ‘moment’	 in	 the	 history	 of	
Australian	criminal	law.	The	MCC	represents	a	high	point	of	faith	in	the	value	and	possibility	of	
systematising,	rationalising	and	modernising	criminal	law.	As	stated	by	the	Criminal	Law	Officers	
Committee	of	the	Standing	Committee	of	Attorneys‐General	which	developed	it	(here	called	the	
‘Code	Committee’),2	the	MCC	aimed	to	provide	Australia	with	‘consistency,	if	not	uniformity’	in	
criminal	law	(Code	Committee	1992:	ii).	Criminal	responsibility—the	rules	according	to	which	
the	legal	system	attributes	a	particular	act	or	omission	to	a	particular	individual	(Lacey	2016)—
was	central	to	the	reform	endeavour	embodied	in	the	MCC.	When	the	Code	Committee	held	its	
first	formal	meeting,	priority	was	given	to	the	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	on	the	basis	
that	these	were	‘the	very	foundations	of	any	system	of	criminal	justice’	(Scott	1992:	351).	This	
first	 set	 of	materials	would	 come	 to	 form	 Chapter	 2	 of	 the	MCC,	 titled	 ‘General	 Principles	 of	
Criminal	 Responsibility’.	 Chapter	 2	 was	 intended	 to	 ‘codify’	 the	 principles	 of	 criminal	
responsibility	(Model	Criminal	Code	s	101),	which	were	regarded	as	the	lynchpin	of	the	criminal	
law.		
	
Measured	in	terms	of	ambition	and	scope,	the	MCC	was	the	most	significant	criminal	law	reform	
project	 in	 Australia’s	 history	 but,	 measured	 in	 terms	 of	 outcomes,	 the	MCC	 has	 not	 been	 as	
significant,	nor	as	successful,	as	its	drafters	had	hoped.	By	modelling	‘best	practice’	in	criminal	
law	(Goode	2004:	234),	the	MCC	aimed	to	bring	Australia’s	nine	criminal	jurisdictions—six	state	
governments,	 two	 territory	 governments	 and	 the	 federal	 government—into	 some	 sort	 of	
alignment.	This	was	no	easy	task:	in	the	Australian	Federation,	most	criminal	law	is	state‐based,	
and	Australia	has	both	common	law	criminal	jurisdictions	(New	South	Wales,	Victoria	and	South	
Australia)	 and,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 earlier	 systematising	 efforts,	 jurisdictions	 with	 criminal	 codes	
(Australian	Capital	Territory,	Northern	Territory,	Queensland,	Tasmania,	and	Western	Australia,	
as	well	as	the	Commonwealth).3	Crucially,	as	I	discuss	in	this	paper,	the	common	law	states	and	
the	 code	 states	 adopt	 different	 approaches	 to	 the	 principles	 of	 criminal	 responsibility.	 The	
drafters	of	the	MCC	attempted	to	resolve	this	issue	once	and	for	all,	and	to	generate	a	centripetal	
force	in	criminal	law	in	Australia.	But,	with	state	jurisdictions	taking	up	the	MCC	provisions	in	a	
piecemeal	 and	 uneven	way,	 it	 has	 not	 been	 thought	 to	 have	 had	 a	 decisive	 influence	 on	 the	
Australian	criminal	law	landscape.	As	I	argue	in	this	paper,	the	significance	of	the	MCC	as	a	law	
reform	project	 lies	on	 the	conceptual	 level,	 in	 the	 language	 through	which	 the	criminal	 law	 is	
understood.	
	
This	paper	assesses	the	MCC	as	a	criminal	law	reform	project	and	explores	questions	of	how	the	
MCC	came	into	being,	and	why	it	took	shape	in	certain	ways	at	a	particular	time.	The	paper	tackles	
these	questions	from	two	perspectives:	 ‘external’	and	 ‘internal’;	 in	other	words,	 looking	at	the	
MCC	from	the	‘outside’	and	the	‘inside’.	I	make	two	main	arguments.	First,	I	argue	that,	driven	by	
a	‘top	down’	law	reform	process,	the	MCC	came	into	being	at	a	time	when	other	changes	in	crime	
and	 criminal	 justice	were	 occurring,	 and	 that	 it	may	 be	understood	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 achieve	
stability	 in	a	 time	of	change.	Second,	 I	argue	 that	 the	significance	of	 the	principles	of	 criminal	
responsibility,	which	formed	the	central	pivot	of	the	MCC,	lies	in	the	coherence	these	principles	
provided	on	 a	 conceptual	 level,	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 language	 through	which	 the	 criminal	 law	 is	
thought	about,	organised	and	reformed.	
	
This	paper	contains	four	main	sections.	In	the	first	two	sections,	I	examine	the	creation	of	the	MCC	
via	a	sui	generis	law	reform	body,	and	then	offer	an	analysis	of	the	reasons	the	MCC	appeared	in	
the	 1990s.	 In	 the	 third	 and	 fourth	 sections,	 I	 outline	 the	 principles	 of	 criminal	 responsibility	
contained	in	Chapter	2	of	the	MCC	and	critically	assess	their	significance	in	the	MCC.	I	conclude	
with	a	brief	discussion	of	developments	in	relation	to	the	MCC	post‐enactment,	in	1995,	as	The	
Commonwealth	Criminal	Code.	
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The	creation	of	the	Australian	MCC	
The	 creation	 of	 the	 MCC	 was	 the	 activity	 of	 an	 intellectual	 elite.	 It	 was	 conceived,	 drafted,	
discussed	and	 finalised	by	a	small	 circle	of	 lawyers,	public	 servants	and	politicians	who	were	
aiming	for	a	more	perfect	formulation	of	the	criminal	law.	Against	the	backdrop	of	a	long	tradition	
of	criminal	law	codification	projects	and,	with	adherence	to	principle	over	policy	or	politics,	the	
drafters	approached	work	on	the	MCC	as	an	opportunity	to	formulate	‘best	practice	basic	criminal	
law	provisions’	(Goode	2002:	163),	developed	free	from	the	restrictions	of	a	particular	case	and	
unsullied	by	political	or	policy	considerations.	These	features	of	the	conception	and	drafting	of	
the	MCC	suggest	that	it	represents	‘top	down’	reform	of	the	criminal	law.	
	
The	MCC	was	the	product	of	an	unusual	 law	reform	process.	 In	February	1987,	the	Review	of	
Commonwealth	Criminal	Law	Committee	was	formed	with	a	brief	to	overhaul	the	Commonwealth	
criminal	 law	 (Goode	 1991a).	 The	 Committee,	 chaired	 by	 the	 Hon.	 Harry	 Gibbs	 (the	 ‘Gibbs	
Committee’),	 produced	 a	 draft	 Bill	 for	 a	 Federal	 criminal	 code	 (Review	 of	 Commonwealth	
Criminal	Law	(Australia)	1990)	but	 this	was	not	 introduced	 into	parliament.	The	work	of	 the	
Gibbs	Committee	inspired	efforts	to	develop	a	criminal	code	for	all	Australian	jurisdictions	and,	
in	1990,	the	Standing	Committee	of	Attorneys‐General	of	Australian	states	and	territories	(SCAG)	
put	 the	development	of	a	uniform	criminal	 code	 for	Australia	on	 its	 agenda	 (Code	Committee	
1992:	 i).	This	move	recognised	 that	a	number	of	Australian	 jurisdictions	were	undertaking	or	
about	to	undertake	reviews	of	their	criminal	law	and,	thus,	that	‘the	time	was	right	to	consider	
moves	towards	at	least	consistency,	if	not	uniformity	in	criminal	law’	(Code	Committee	1992:	ii).	
The	 Code	 Committee	 (Criminal	 Law	 Officers	 Committee),	 comprising	 representatives	 of	 each	
Australian	state	and	territory,	was	formed	as	a	subcommittee	of	SCAG,	and	tasked	with	preparing	
draft	code	materials.	Early	on	in	the	process,	the	goal	shifted	from	a	uniform	code	to	a	model	code,	
on	the	basis	that	this	would	provide	the	best	means	of	‘bridging’	differences	between	the	common	
law	and	code	jurisdictions	in	Australia	(Scott	1992).	
	
The	small	group	of	lawyers	that	developed	the	MCC	were	devoted	to	the	task	of	crafting	a	more	
perfect	criminal	law	as	a	public	service.	The	Code	Committee	was	an	unusual	body	for	two	main	
reasons,	relating	to	constitution	and	brief	(Goode	1991a).	First,	Committee	members	were	drawn	
from	within	the	senior	ranks	of	the	public	service	as	well	as	the	legal	profession,	with	academics	
engaged	as	consultants.	Members	of	the	public	service	appointed	to	the	Committee	were	those	
who	had	special	responsibility	for	advising	their	Attorney‐General	on	criminal	law	issues	(Code	
Committee	1992:	 ii).	The	Committee’s	direct	connections	with	 the	government	of	 the	day—‘it	
consisted	of	 the	very	people	who	were	 in	 a	position	 to	push	 for	 change’,	 in	Matthew	Goode’s	
(2004:	232)	words—were	thought	to	improve	the	chances	its	proposals	would	be	acted	upon.	
But,	by	the	same	token,	the	Committee	did	not	have	a	separate	institutional	identity	and	existed	
solely	to	perform	the	task	of	drafting	the	MCC.	This	fact	may	have	contributed	to	the	low	uptake	
of	 the	 model	 provisions	 by	 Australian	 states.	 Second,	 the	 Code	 Committee	 was	 tasked	 with	
drafting	new	law	rather	than	merely	reviewing	existing	law	and	making	recommendations	for	
reform.	At	this	time,	law	reform	bodies	existed	in	a	number	of	Australian	jurisdictions,	including	
at	the	national	level,	but	none	was	enlisted	in	the	task	of	drafting	a	model	criminal	code.	Taken	
together,	these	two	features	of	the	Code	Committee	indicate	that	the	MCC	was	envisaged	as	an	
administrative	project	with	a	technical	legal	exercise	at	its	core.		
	
The	MCC	was	intended	to	be	a	model	in	that	it	represented	‘ideal	law’,	‘devoid	as	much	as	possible	
of	 local,	parochial,	political	 considerations’	 (Scott	1992:	351).	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	MCC	 is	a	code	
squarely	within	the	Benthamite	codification	tradition	and,	in	broad	terms,	this	tradition	forms	
the	backdrop	to	the	creation	of	the	MCC.	Jeremy	Bentham,	writing	in	the	last	decades	of	the	1700s,	
famously	declared	that	law	is	based	on	universal	principles	which	applied	across	time	and	place,	
and	the	development	of	the	law	was	a	rational	and	technical	rather	than	cultural	or	political	task	
(Lobban	1991;	Postema	1986).	For	Bentham,	the	‘unwritten’	nature	of	the	English	common	law	
and	 the	 lack	 of	 transparency	 of	 its	 language	 (requiring	 that	 law	 be	 interpreted)	 usurped	 the	
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power	 of	 the	 legislature	 (Kayman	 2004:	 214‐216).	 In	Bentham’s	 terms,	 and	 by	 contrast	with	
common	 law	(‘dog	 law’),	written	 (statute)	 law	does	not	 invite	constant	 interpretation	and	re‐
interpretation	(Kayman	2004:	217).	Moreover,	codification	of	 the	 law	had	advantages	beyond	
those	 of	 statute.	 Chief	 among	 these	 is	 recognition	 of	 parliamentary	 sovereignty.	As	Ashworth	
writes,	 the	 enactment	 of	 a	 criminal	 code	 makes	 it	 clear	 that	 ‘the	 creation	 of	 offences	 is	 for	
Parliament	alone,	and	that	the	role	of	the	 judiciary	 is	to	 interpret	rather	than	add	or	subtract’	
(1991:	 420).	 It	 is	 on	 this	 basis	 that	 codes	 are	 held	 to	 serve	 an	 important	 democratic	 and	
constitutional	 function	 (Ashworth	 1991;	 Leader‐Elliott	 2002).	 In	 addition,	 in	 the	 Benthamite	
tradition,	the	virtues	of	a	code	include	simplicity,	completeness	and	accessibility.	
	
Codification	of	the	common	law	of	crime	was	advanced	in	distinctive	ways	by	Commonwealth	
countries	such	as	Australia	(and	Canada,	India	and	elsewhere)	(Wright	2007,	2008).	As	is	well	
known,	Bentham’s	codification	efforts	were	more	successful	abroad	than	at	home	in	England.	The	
Benthamite	Codes	enacted	around	the	world	include	the	Criminal	Code	Act	1899	(Qld)	developed	
by	Sir	Samuel	Griffith,	a	Queensland	lawyer,	judge	and	politician	and	one	of	the	first	members	of	
the	High	Court	of	Australia	(Fricke	1986).	The	Queensland	code,	which	was	also	influenced	by	the	
civil	law	systems	of	continental	Europe,	provided	the	model	for	the	codes	of	Western	Australia	
(Criminal	Code	Act	Compilation	Act	1913	(WA))	and	Tasmania	(Criminal	Code	Act	1924	(Tas)).	Like	
the	MCC,	this	first	generation	of	Australian	codes	(known	as	the	Griffith	Codes)	were	the	product	
of	systematising	and	modernising	efforts.	Each	of	the	Griffith	Codes	devoted	a	section	to	general	
criminal	 responsibility	 principles,	 with	 which	 the	 principles	 adopted	 by	 the	 MCC	 stand	 in	
contrast,	as	I	discuss	below.	
	
Against	the	backdrop	of	the	long	tradition	of	criminal	law	codification	projects,	the	distinctiveness	
of	the	MCC	as	a	code	seems	to	have	come	down	to	a	somewhat	imprecise	idea:	that	of	the	MCC	as	
‘ideal	law’	and	as	a	sort	of	super	legislation.	It	was	taken	for	granted	by	the	drafters	of	the	MCC	
that	the	appropriate	mode	or	form	for	the	reform	of	Australian	criminal	law	was	a	code.	Indeed,	
the	Code	Committee	was	committed	to	the	idea	of	a	code	from	the	outset,	but	it	left	the	precise	
concept	of	the	codification	to	be	utilised	by	the	MCC	drafters	unarticulated	(Gani	2005a,	2005b).	
This	pre‐commitment	seems	to	have	been	in	part	the	result	of	a	general	belief	that	the	process	of	
reform	should	closely	resemble	the	creation	of	the	Model	Penal	Code	(MPC)	in	the	USA	and,	as	
Goode	(1991b:	6)	stated	at	the	time,	this	‘necessarily	[emphasis	in	original]	involves	codification	
in	non‐Code	states	and	territories’.	The	MPC,	drafted	over	a	period	of	ten	years	by	The	American	
Law	Institute	(without	government	backing),	had	been	published	 in	1962	(The	American	Law	
Institute	1962).	Like	the	MCC,	the	MPC	was	intended	as	a	model	for	future	legislators	(Farmer	
2014).	In	addition,	and	as	the	Code	Committee	members	were	aware,	at	the	time	work	on	the	MCC	
commenced,	work	on	criminal	codes	had	been	undertaken	in	England,	Canada	(recodification)	
and	 New	 Zealand	 (Code	 Committee	 1992:	 ii).	 This	 seemed	 to	 indicate	 that	 codification	 was	
occurring	across	the	common	law	world.	Beyond	this,	the	idea	of	a	model	code—as	both	ideal	law	
and	as	a	kind	of	super	legislation—seems	to	have	fitted	the	spirit	of	the	times,	as	I	discuss	in	the	
next	section.		
	
As	the	mode	of	reform	of	the	law—as	a	code—was	taken	for	granted,	the	rationale	for	a	code	was	
largely	external	to	the	drafting	process.	Discussion	of	the	MCC	as	a	code	seems	to	have	operated	
mostly	at	the	level	of	rhetoric.	Goode,	who	seems	to	be	the	chief	defender	of	the	MCC,	offered	the	
most	elaborate	defence	of	the	MCC	as	a	code.	Both	at	the	time	of	its	formulation	and	in	the	years	
since,	Goode	invoked	Bentham	in	arguing	that	codification	was	necessary	because	the	criminal	
law	should	be	‘easy	to	discover,	easy	to	understand,	cheap	to	buy,	and	democratically	made	and	
amended’	 (1992:	 15‐16).	 For	 Goode,	 the	 MCC	 as	 a	 code	 modernised	 the	 law	 by	 putting	 the	
legislature	in	charge.	Beyond	invocation	of	democracy	and	modernisation,	it	is	not	clear	that	all	
the	implications	of	law	reform	as	codification	were	appreciated.	Similarly,	when	it	came	to	debate	
in	parliament,	the	mode	of	the	reform	as	a	code	does	not	seem	to	have	been	expressly	considered	
by	legislators.4	Parliamentarians	made	references	to	Bentham’s	famous	quip	about	common	law	
as	‘dog	law’,	a	number	of	legislators	referenced	the	virtues	of	codification	(Cleeland	1995:	1352‐
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53;	 Kerr	 1995:	 1349‐1352),	 and	The	Hon	Philip	Ruddock	MP	 referred	 to	 ‘almost	 unanimous’	
support	for	‘the	concept	[emphasis	added]	of	the	model	national	Criminal	Code’	(Ruddock	1995:	
1340),	but	the	distinctiveness	of	this	mode	of	reform	of	the	criminal	 law	did	not	garner	much	
attention.	
	
It	is	in	part	because	the	mode	of	reform	of	the	criminal	law	as	a	code	was	taken	for	granted	that	
greater	attention	was	not	given	to	principles	of	interpretation	of	the	MCC.	Chapter	1	of	the	MCC	
was	intended	to	cover	the	‘mechanics	of	implementing	a	Code’	(Code	Committee	1992:	3)	and	to	
provide	guidance	on	interpretation	of	its	provisions,	but	it	was	never	written.5	Controversy	over	
the	 interpretation	 clauses	 that	had	been	drafted	 for	 the	 criminal	 code	 for	England	and	Wales	
(Ashworth	1991),	and	uncertainty	about	whether	principles	of	interpretation	were	a	legislative	
or	judicial	responsibility,	seem	to	have	dampened	the	Code	Committee’s	efforts	to	develop	such	
principles.	In	the	end,	the	MCC	drafters	relied	on	an	analysis	by	Ashworth	(1991)	regarding	the	
English	criminal	code	to	conclude	that	such	principles	of	 interpretation	were	not	essential.	As	
Miriam	 Gani	 (2005b:	 275)	 suggests,	 the	 omission	 of	 general	 interpretation	 provisions	 is	
particularly	surprising	considering	principles	of	statutory	interpretation	are	regarded	as	settled	
law	in	Australia,	and	‘interpretation’	legislation	mandating	purposive	construction	exist	in	each	
Australia	jurisdiction	(for	example,	Acts	Interpretation	Act	1901	(Cth)).	In	the	years	since	1995,	
the	absence	of	the	principles	of	interpretation	from	The	Commonwealth	Criminal	Code	has	been	
regarded	 as	 one	 of	 its	 weaknesses	 (Gani	 2005b).6	 Gani	 (2005b:	 279)	 describes	 it	 as	 a	 ‘legal	
paradox’	that	a	‘legislative‐centric’	approach	to	the	criminal	law	did	not	also	entail	legislation	on	
interpretation.	I	return	to	this	issue	of	the	absence	of	principles	of	interpretation	below.	
	
The	efforts	of	 the	drafters	and	others	 involved	 in	 the	Code	Committee	bore	 fruit	 in	what	was	
initially	a	short	draft	criminal	code.	The	Criminal	Code	Bill	1994	containing	a	revised	version	of	
the	MCC	as	an	appendix	was	introduced	to	the	Commonwealth	parliament	in	June	1994.	At	this	
point,	the	MCC	contained	only	Chapter	1	(containing	just	one	clause)	and	Chapter	2.	That	same	
year,	 the	Commonwealth,	state	and	territory	Premiers’	Leaders	Forum	endorsed	the	MCC	as	a	
project	 of	 national	 significance	 and	 unanimously	 gave	 commitments	 to	 fostering	 its	
implementation	 by	 2001	 (Goode	 1997).	 Against	 a	 political	 and	 constitutional	 backdrop	 often	
characterised	 as	 ‘uncooperative	 federalism’,	 the	 MCC	 was	 carried	 by	 the	 momentum	 of	
exceptional	 state‐territory‐Commonwealth	 collaboration,	 receiving	 largely	 positive	 if	 brief	
welcome	across	the	political	spectrum	in	the	Commonwealth	parliament	(Spindler	1994:	352;	
Vanstone	1994:	351).	The	Criminal	Code	Bill	1994	became	the	Criminal	Code	Act	1995	(Cth),	with	
what	was	now	The	Commonwealth	Criminal	Code	 included	as	 a	 Schedule.	At	 this	point,	 it	was	
confidently	anticipated	by	both	politicians	and	many	legal	professionals	that	the	model	offence	
and	 defence	 provisions	 would	 have	 a	 decisive	 influence	 on	 criminal	 law	 in	 Australia	 and	 be	
implemented	progressively	by	all	Australian	states	(Crowley	1994:	2382).	 	
	
Why	the	1990s?	Stability	in	a	time	of	change	
Although	 it	 might	 have	 appeared	 otherwise	 to	 the	 drafters—for	 whom	 the	 MCC’s	 time	 had	
come—the	creation	of	a	Commonwealth	code	was	not	a	 ‘natural’	act:	rather,	it	was	contingent	
and	political.	So	the	question	arises	as	to	why	the	MCC	was	developed	in	the	1990s;	why	was	a	
major	reform	of	the	criminal	law	perceived	to	be	valuable	at	that	time?	Here,	I	suggest	that	the	
MCC	promised	stability	in	what	was	perceived	to	be	a	time	of	significant	change.	The	interplay	of	
four	 factors	 generated	 this	 perception	 of	 significant	 change.	 These	 factors	 put	 pressure	 on	
existing	arrangements	of	primarily	state‐based	criminal	law	and	generated	momentum	for	the	
reform	in	Australia.	
	
The	 first	 factor	 was	 the	 changing	 reality	 of	 crime.	 When	 discussion	 about	 a	 criminal	 code	
commenced,	the	reality	of	crime	in	Australia	was	perceived	to	be	changing.	Trans‐jurisdictional	
crime,	particularly	drug	crimes	and	organised	crime,	was	impacting	on	the	Australian	criminal	
landscape.	 The	 Australian	 Royal	 Commission	 of	 Inquiry	 into	 Drugs	 (1980)	 (known	 as	 the	
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‘Williams	Commission’)	had	called	for	uniform	drug	trafficking	legislation	(Bush	2009),	and	drug	
policy	had	risen	high	on	the	political	agenda,	in	large	part	because	of	the	growth	in	the	use	of	illicit	
drugs,	including	heroin	(Bennett	2008).	In	addition,	computer	crime	had	come	to	be	perceived	as	
a	serious	threat.	Developments	such	as	these	heightened	political	awareness	that	crime	does	not	
respect	jurisdictional	boundaries	(Crowley	1994:	2379).	In	the	then	Minister	for	Justice	The	Hon	
Duncan	Kerr’s	words,	‘criminal	activity	does	not	recognise	the	boundary	lines	drawn	on	the	map	
of	Australia’	(quoted	in	Easterbrook	1993:	9).	By	the	time	discussion	about	a	model	criminal	code	
was	under	way,	the	old	adage	that	‘all	crime	is	local’	was	under	some	pressure.	
	
The	second	 factor	contributing	 to	a	perception	of	change	was	 the	changing	reality	of	 criminal	
justice.	There	were	two	aspects	to	this:	changes	in	relations	between	parts	of	the	criminal	justice	
system;	 and	 the	 changing	 relationship	 between	 state	 and	 Commonwealth	 criminal	 justice	
systems.	With	regard	to	the	first	aspect,	the	last	decades	of	the	twentieth	century	were	a	time	of	
flux.	 The	 size	 of	 criminal	 justice	 systems	 had	 grown	 significantly,	 and	 policing	 practices	 and	
increasing	 prison	 numbers	 were	 prominent	 political	 issues.	 Further,	 both	 the	 states	 and	 the	
Commonwealth	 recognised	 the	escalating	cost	of	 criminal	 justice	as	an	 issue	 (Vanstone	1994:	
351).	In	spruiking	the	MCC,	the	Minister	for	Justice	emphasised	that	 it	would	remove	barriers	
facing	 law	 enforcement	 officers	 investigating	 interstate	 crimes	 and	 cut	 down	 the	 cost	 of	
administering	justice	(Easterbrook	1993).	The	‘front	end’	of	criminal	justice—law	enforcement—
was	increasingly	regarded	as	an	important	part	of	the	justice	system,	compared	with	the	‘back	
end’,	the	courts.	In	touting	the	benefits	of	a	series	of	national	law	reforms,	including	the	MCC,	the	
then	 Prime	 Minister,	 The	 Hon	 Paul	 Keating,	 called	 for	 a	 ‘more	 sophisticated	 emphasis	 on	
prevention’	rather	than	reactive	reposes	to	crime	(Willox	1994:	4).	The	relationship	between	the	
judiciary	and	the	legislature	was	also	changing.	The	end	of	the	1980s	and	the	early	1990s	brought	
with	it	the	spectre	of	‘judicial	activism’.7	Concern	about	‘judicial	activism’	in	this	period	can	be	
mapped	to	a	corresponding	desire	on	the	part	of	the	legislature	to	‘reassert’	dominance	over	the	
judiciary	through,	for	instance,	codification	of	the	law.	
	
An	 additional	 aspect	 of	 this	 change	 in	 the	 criminal	 justice	 landscape	 related	 to	 the	 evolving	
relationship	between	state	and	Commonwealth	criminal	justice	systems.	In	1901,	at	the	time	of	
Federation,	states	had	retained	power	to	pass	criminal	 laws,	but,	by	the	end	of	 the	1980s,	 the	
scope	of	Commonwealth	criminal	law	had	grown	significantly.	In	addition	to	laws	enacted	under	
specific	 constitutional	 heads	 of	 power	 such	 as	 customs	 (drug	 importation)	 and	
telecommunications	(computer	crimes),	ratification	of	various	international	treaties	had	enabled	
the	Commonwealth	to	legislate	in	new	areas	under	its	external	affairs	power	(Commonwealth	of	
Australia	Constitution	Act	s	51(xxix);	Polyukhovich	v	Commonwealth	(1991)	172	CLR	501).	While	
state	laws	continued	(and	continue)	to	cover	‘core’	offences	such	as	murder,	sexual	assault	and	
assault,	 the	 Commonwealth	 had	 enacted	 more	 specialised	 offences—in	 the	 areas	 of	 the	
environment	and	taxation,	for	instance—and	also	covered	the	field	of	high	profile	crimes	such	as	
drug	importation.		
	
The	 effect	 of	 the	 Commonwealth’s	 growing	 legislative	 reach	 constitutes	 the	 third	 factor	
generating	 a	 perception	 of	 significant	 change:	 the	 expansion	 of	 Commonwealth	 criminal	 law	
exacerbated	 perceived	 problems	 of	 Federalism	 for	 criminal	 justice	 in	 Australia.	 By	 the	 early	
1990s,	the	growth	in	the	number	of	Commonwealth	offences	sitting	outside	the	Crimes	Act	1914	
(Cth)	was	 burgeoning.	 Although	 these	 offences	were	 regarded	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Commonwealth	
criminal	law,	as	a	result	of	sections	79	and	80	of	the	Judiciary	Act	1903	(Cth),	they	were	subject	to	
the	procedural	law	of	the	state	in	which	the	offence	was	tried.	The	existence	of	these	extra‐mural	
offences	was	 perceived	 as	 adversely	 affecting	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Several	 authors	 pointed	 to	 the	
difficulties	of	 charging	different	 individuals	with	 the	 same	 (Commonwealth)	offence,	 yet	have	
them	subjected	to	different	procedural	rules	depending	on	the	state	jurisdiction	in	which	they	
were	charged	(Colvin	1991;	Goode	1997).	When	the	MCC	was	enacted,	the	fact	that	it	ensured	
that,	‘for	the	first	time	since	Federation	those	accused	of	Federal	offences	will	be	dealt	with	under	
the	same	principles’	was	 lauded	(Crowley	1994:	2379),	with	 the	Minister	 for	 Justice,	The	Hon	
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Duncan	Kerr,	 stating	 that	 the	Code	 advanced	 ‘true	 equality	 before	 the	 law	 in	Australia’	 (Kerr	
1994).	
	
The	fourth	and	final	factor	giving	rise	to	a	perception	of	change	was	a	more	nebulous	but	strongly	
felt	need	for	modernisation	of	the	criminal	law.	The	need	for	modernisation	was	expressed	by	
politicians	 as	well	 as	MCC	drafters	 and	 commentators.	 This	 need	 for	modernisation	 revolved	
around	 the	 value	 of	 bringing	 principles	 and	 practices	 up	 to	 date,	 and	 concern	 that	 multiple	
criminal	 legal	regimes	were	both	unnecessary	and	unjustified,	acting	to	impede	economic	and	
national	development.	The	‘centuries	of	development,	much	of	it	ad	hoc’	of	the	criminal	law	had	
generated	‘loopholes	and	gaps’	that	an	‘in	depth	and	principled’	review	of	the	criminal	law	could	
address	(Griffin	2002‐2003:	264).	Part	of	this	modernisation	was	the	streamlining	of	the	criminal	
law	across	code	and	common	law	jurisdictions,	with	the	MCC	labelled	‘one	of	the	most	ambitious	
legal	simplification	programs	ever	attempted	in	Australia’	(Explanatory	Memorandum	Criminal	
Code	Bill	 1994:	1).	Differences	between	Australian	 jurisdictions	 regarding	 the	age	of	 criminal	
responsibility	and	the	age	of	consent	were	touchstone	issues,	decried	by	the	Attorney‐General	for	
Queensland	 as	 ‘lunacy	or	 at	 best	 illogicality’	 in	 a	 country	 as	 ‘homogenous	 as	Australia’	 (Wills	
1990:	111).	In	Parliament,	reference	was	made	to	a	general	community	desire	to	unify	laws	as	far	
as	 possible	 (Slipper	 1995:	 1353).	 Echoing	 the	 ideas	 of	 nation‐building	 associated	 with	 the	
criminal	codes	of	Queensland	and	Western	Australia,	for	instance,	uniform	criminal	law	was	said	
to	be	necessary	as	‘we	become	closer	together	and	as	we	seek	to	operate	as	a	nation’	(Ruddock	
1995:	1337).		
	
Beyond	the	criminal	law	and	criminal	justice,	the	1990s	was	a	period	marked	by	several	other	
major,	 national	 legal	 developments,	 which	 reveal	 that	 the	 momentum	 for	 reform	 extended	
beyond	the	criminal	law.	These	developments	were	part	of	a	raft	of	economic	and	other	reforms	
aimed	 at	 market	 liberalisation	 to	 ensure	 efficiency	 and	 growth.	 The	 early	 1990s	 saw	 the	
enactment	of	‘corporations	legislation’	throughout	Australian	jurisdictions	(such	as	Corporations	
Act	2001	(Cth)).	Following	 ‘the	excesses	of	the	1980s’,	these	reforms	focused	on	responsibility	
and	 accountability,	 broadening	 duties	 of	 directors,	 and	 enhancing	 shareholders’	 rights	 (Rose	
1995).	This	was	also	the	period	of	taxation	reform	and	codification	of	consumer	credit	contracts.	
While	the	economic	case	for	uniform	or	consistent	criminal	law	might	seem	less	self‐evident	than	
for	corporations	law,	debate	at	the	time	included	a	number	of	references	to	the	economic	benefits	
associated	 with	 a	 uniform	 criminal	 law:	 the	 ability	 of	 lawyers	 to	 work	 in	 more	 than	 one	
jurisdiction;	and	the	accommodation	of	an	increasingly	mobile	populace	involved	in	business	and	
recreation	across	state	and	territory	boundaries	(Kerr	1995:	1332).	In	further	evidence	of	this	
trend	towards	uniformity,	at	about	the	same	time	as	the	MCC	was	being	drafted	and	debated,	the	
uniform	 ‘evidence	 legislation’	 producing	 standard	 rules	 of	 evidence	 to	 be	 enacted	 into	 each	
jurisdiction	was	 also	 being	 formulated.	 In	 general,	 law	 reform	 was	 depicted	 as	 key	 to	 social	
progress	and	growth:	Prime	Minister	The	Hon	Paul	Keating	connected	it	to	ensuring	Australia	
could	count	itself	as	a	‘great	social	democracy’	(quoted	in	Willox	1994:	4).	
	
Outside	Australia,	multiple	developments	in	the	international	legal	order	arguably	enhanced	the	
need	for	the	harmonisation	of	laws	within	Australia.	By	the	1990s,	international	human	rights	
schemas	 and	 international	 criminal	 justice	 matters—with	 the	 state	 as	 defendant—were	
beginning	to	place	pressure	on	domestic	criminal	justice	practices	(such	as	in	Dietrich	v	R	(1992)	
177	CLR	292).8	At	the	same	time,	perceptions	of	increasing	interconnectedness—typically	going	
under	 the	umbrella	 concept	of	 globalisation—were	making	 subnational	divisions	 in	 countries	
such	 as	 Australia	 less	 significant.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	MCC	 project	 represents	 something	 of	 the	
Zeitgeist	 of	 the	 1990s:	 it	 involved	 the	 re‐inscription	 of	 boundaries—at	 a	 national	 rather	 than	
subnational	 level—and	 the	 ‘fixing’	 of	 the	 internal	 or	 domestic	 in	 the	 face	 of	 profound	
destabilising,	global	change.	‘Fixing’	such	boundaries	at	the	national	level	presented	a	stronger	
and	 more	 relevant	 front,	 and	 the	 MCC	 seemed	 to	 include	 an	 implicit	 promise	 to	 equip	 the	
Australian	nation	for	the	challenges	of	a	new	century.	
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Criminal	responsibility	in	the	Australian	MCC	
The	general	principles	of	criminal	responsibility,	comprising	Chapter	2,	form	the	heart	of	the	MCC.	
These	principles	provided	the	basis	on	which	the	MCC	offered	‘consistency,	if	not	uniformity’	in	
the	 criminal	 law	 (Code	 Committee	 1992:	 ii).	 Here,	 I	 show	 how	 the	 principles	 of	 criminal	
responsibility	 provided	 the	 central	 pivot	 for	 the	 systematisation	 and	 rationalisation	 of	 the	
criminal	law	that	the	MCC	embodied.	
	
With	its	presentation	of	the	principles	of	criminal	responsibility,	Chapter	2	was	regarded	as	the	
most	important	chapter	of	the	MCC.	As	stated	in	the	first	reading	speech	introducing	the	Criminal	
Code	Bill	in	the	Commonwealth	Senate	in	1994,	the	general	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	
are	 ‘the	 foundations	of	 the	Commonwealth	 criminal	 law’	 (Crowley	1994:	2379).	 For	 the	Code	
Committee,	 ‘starting	 at	 the	 beginning’	 involved	 starting	 with	 the	 principles	 of	 criminal	
responsibility	 (Goode	 1997:	 269).	 Chapter	 2	 was	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 MCC	 to	 be	 prepared,	
borrowing	from	the	earlier	statement	on	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	drafted	by	the	Gibbs	
Committee.	 It	was	 intended	 that	 the	principles	of	 criminal	 responsibility	would	be	 capable	of	
adoption	by	all	jurisdictions	(Code	Committee	1992);	that	is,	they	would	not	bear	the	stamp	of	
any	particular	jurisdiction	(although	they	bore	the	stamp	of	the	common	law	in	their	embrace	of	
subjectivism,	as	discussed	below).	The	drafters	held	these	principles	as	sacred,	stating	that,	 ‘in	
principle’,	 the	 ‘basic	rules	of	criminal	responsibility’	should	not	vary	from	state	to	state	(Code	
Committee	1992:	5).	Chapter	2	was	left	largely	unchanged	between	initial	draft	and	enactment,	
with	the	exception	of	the	law	regarding	intoxication.9	
	
The	MCC	adopted	what	has	been	labelled	a	‘compound’	approach	to	criminal	responsibility:	that	
is,	criminal	responsibility	is	the	result	of	proof	of	all	the	elements	of	an	offence,	and	disproof	or	
failure	of	any	defences	open	on	the	facts	(Leader‐Elliott	2002,	2009a).	The	central	provision	of	
Chapter	2,	Model	Criminal	Code	s	201,	which	Leader‐Elliott	describes	as	its	 ‘primary	analytical	
achievement’,	relates	to	elements	of	an	offence	(Leader‐Elliott	2002:	31).	This	provision	defines	
all	 offences	 as	 comprising	 ‘physical’	 and	 ‘fault’	 elements	 (terminology	 which	 replaced	 the	
common	law	states’	reliance	on	the	terms	actus	reus	and	mens	rea).	The	‘physical	elements’	are	
defined	 as	 conduct,	 circumstance	 or	 result	 (Model	 Criminal	Code	 s	 202).	 ‘Fault	 elements’	 are	
intention,	recklessness,	knowledge	or	negligence	(Model	Criminal	Code	s	203).	The	MCC	provides	
that	a	 fault	 element	attaches	 to	each	physical	 element	unless	 the	 legislature	 imposes	strict	or	
absolute	liability	for	that	element	(the	presumption	of	fault)	(Model	Criminal	Code	ss	204‐205).	
Chapter	2	also	defines	‘voluntariness’,	and	itemises	circumstances	in	which	there	is	no	criminal	
responsibility	 (children	 aged	 under	 10,	 children	 aged	 between	 10	 and	 14,	 and	 mental	
impairment)	 (Model	Criminal	Code	 ss	 202.2.1,	 301,	 302).	 Provisions	 relating	 to	 extensions	 of	
liability,	 corporate	 criminal	 responsibility,	 proof	 of	 criminal	 responsibility,	 and	 geographical	
jurisdiction	make	up	the	rest	of	Chapter	2.	
	
Crucially	and	controversially,	the	MCC	oriented	the	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	around	
subjective	fault,	the	idea	that	criminal	fault	should	depend	on	what	the	accused	himself	or	herself	
‘knew,	believed	or	intended	at	the	time	of	the	conduct’	(Code	Committee	1992:	21).	Reflecting	
this	orientation	and	the	ability	of	the	drafters	to	impress	their	views	on	the	product	of	the	reform	
process	from	the	‘top	down’,	the	MCC	provided	that	the	default	fault	element	for	a	criminal	offence	
is	recklessness,	which	was	defined	following	the	Model	Penal	Code,	as	the	advertent	taking	of	a	
substantial	and	unjustifiable	risk	(Model	Criminal	Code	s	203.5).	The	language	of	physical	and	fault	
elements	(rather	than	the	language	of	the	existing	criminal	codes	of	will,	accident	and	chance)	
(Colvin	1991),	and	the	embrace	of	subjectivism,	entailed	a	conscious	rejection	of	the	principles	of	
criminal	 responsibility	 as	 they	 applied	 in	 the	 Australian	 code	 jurisdictions.	 Reflecting	 their	
nineteenth	 century	 origins,	 the	 criminal	 codes	 of	 states	 such	 as	 Queensland	 and	 Western	
Australia	 adhered	 (and	 continue	 to	 adhere)	 to	 objective	 fault	 principles,	 where	 criminal	
responsibility	is	negated	by	accident,	or	honest	and	reasonable	mistake,	or	by	automatism	(Colvin	
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1991).	This	decision	by	 the	MCC	drafters	disappointed	 lawyers	 from	code	states:	 as	one	such	
commentator	commented,	the	MCC	opted	for	‘systematic	subjectivism’	(Colvin	1991:	85).		
	
The	 principles	 of	 criminal	 responsibility	 contained	 in	 Chapter	 2	 had	 several	 sources.	 First,	
Chapter	2	was	modelled	on	the	corresponding	article	of	the	US	Model	Penal	Code	(from	which	the	
title	of	the	chapter	came)	(Leader‐Elliott	2002,	2006).	Second,	the	elements	of	offences	provisions	
in	Chapter	2	also	owed	a	debt	to	Justice	Brennan’s	judgment	in	He	Kaw	Teh	((1985)	157	CLR	523)	
which,	in	re‐inscribing	the	significance	of	the	common	law	presumption	that	statutory	offences	
require	proof	of	 fault,	provided	a	 template	 for	 the	elements	of	 criminal	 responsibility	 (Goode	
2002).	Third,	as	mentioned	above,	Chapter	2	also	reflected	the	recommendations	of	the	Gibbs	
Committee	 (Review	 of	 Commonwealth	 Criminal	 Law	 (Australia)	 1990),	 which	 had	 drafted	
principles	of	criminal	responsibility	that	would	not	involve	 ‘radical	reform’,	but	would	‘restate	
existing	 principles’	 and	 ‘fill	 gaps,	 remove	 obscurities	 and	 correct	 anomalies’	 (1990:	 [3.12]).	
Fourth,	 and	 most	 significantly,	 Chapter	 2’s	 antecedent	 was	 the	 common	 law	 on	 criminal	
responsibility.	The	Code	Committee	presented	the	decision	to	opt	for	the	common	law	and	the	
principle	of	subjective	fault	as	bringing	Australia	into	line	with	other	nations,	noting	that	the	US,	
English,	Canadian	and	New	Zealand	codes	had	all	adopted	the	subjective	fault	approach	(Code	
Committee	1992).		
	
Criminal	responsibility	provided	the	central	pivot	of	the	systematising	and	rationalising	effort	
that	the	MCC	embodied.	There	are	two	aspects	to	this	point.	The	first	relates	to	efforts	to	offer	an	
exhaustive	coverage	of	criminal	responsibility	principles.	Chapter	2	was	intended	to	‘codify’	the	
principles	of	criminal	responsibility	(Model	Criminal	Code	s	101).	Broadly	speaking,	the	principles	
of	criminal	responsibility	contained	in	the	MCC	correspond	to	what	had	come	to	be	known	as	the	
‘general	part’	of	criminal	law;	the	backbone	of	criminal	law	in	common	law	systems	(that	part	of	
criminal	law	that	is	‘generalisable’,	as	opposed	to	specific	offences	and	defences,	which	comprise	
the	 ‘special	 part’	 of	 criminal	 law)	 (Fletcher	 2000).	 Individual	 responsibility	 is	 central	 to	 the	
general	part	of	 the	criminal	 law,	and	organises	 the	distinction	between	 it	and	the	special	part	
(Farmer	2016;	Lacey	2016).	Although	the	construction	of	a	‘general	part’	of	criminal	law	has	been	
a	largely	academic	endeavour,	beginning	with	the	growth	of	the	legal‐philosophical	tradition	of	
criminal	law	theory	in	the	post‐WWII	period,	the	MCC	and	other	codification	projects	harnessed	
scholarly	resources	(such	as	Glanville	Williams’	(1961)	seminal	text	Criminal	Law:	The	General	
Part,	first	published	in	1953)	to	support	and	legitimate	the	professional	activity	of	rationalising	
criminal	law	in	code	form	(Bronitt	and	Gani	2009;	Horder	2003).		
	
The	 second	way	 in	which	 the	 principles	 of	 criminal	 responsibility	were	 central	 to	 the	MCC’s	
systematising	 and	 rationalising	 effort	 concerns	 the	 orientation	 of	 principles	 of	 criminal	
responsibility	 around	 subjective	 fault.	 The	 MCC	 was	 intended	 as	 a	 definitive	 adjudication	
between	subjective	and	objective	fault	in	criminal	law—and	between	the	common	law	states’	and	
the	 code	 states’	 approaches	 to	 criminal	 responsibility—in	 favour	 of	 the	 former.	 While	 one	
common	law	commentator	labeled	the	criminal	responsibility	principles	contained	in	the	MCC	
‘conservative	 or	 traditional’	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 they	 had	 been	 articulated	 by	 academic	
commentators	 in	 the	 post‐WWII	 era	 (Leader‐Elliott	 2002:	 31),	 given	 the	 division	 between	
Australian	criminal	jurisdictions,	the	triumph	of	subjectivism	could	not	be	taken	for	granted	in	
the	Australian	context.	Following	careful	consideration,	the	MCC	drafters	embraced	the	common	
law	 approach	 to	 responsibility	 and	 subjective	 fault.	 Subjectivism	 was	 seen	 to	 represent	 the	
modern	criminal	law,	with	the	Code	Committee	noting	that	the	trend	over	time	had	been	towards	
a	strengthening	of	the	presumption	that	subjective	intent	is	part	of	all	offences	(Code	Committee	
1992).	Subjectivism	is	significant	because,	in	its	modern	form,	it	is	seen	as	a	means	of	respecting	
freedom	of	action	and	treating	individuals	as	moral	agents	(Horder	2003).	As	such,	it	is	held	up	
as	 a	 constraint	 on	 criminalisation:	 a	 way	 of	 establishing	 a	 limit	 on	 permissible	 state	 action.	
Although	the	strength	of	 this	 limitation	on	 the	scope	of	 the	criminal	 law	has	been	questioned	
(Farmer	2016;	Lacey	2016),	in	line	with	the	tradition	of	codification	referred	to	above,	it	seems	
that	the	drafters	of	the	MCC	intended	subjective	fault	to	operate	in	this	way.		
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With	Chapter	2’s	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	as	the	central	pivot,	the	remainder	of	the	
MCC	 was	 intended	 to	 ‘cover	 the	 field’.	 The	 other	 chapters	 of	 the	 MCC,	 which	 were	 drafted	
progressively	 throughout	 the	 1990s,	 covered	 the	 ‘core’	 or	 ‘mainstream’	 criminal	 law,	 such	 as	
sexual	 offences,	 and	 more	 peripheral	 parts	 of	 the	 corpus,	 such	 as	 conspiracy	 to	 defraud.10	
Although	 there	 were	 some	 notable	 omissions,11	 and	 while	 it	 was	 always	 intended	 that	 a	
significant	part	of	the	corpus	of	Commonwealth	criminal	law	would	continue	to	sit	outside	the	
MCC,	 the	MCC	 aimed	 to	 provide	model	 offence	 and	 defence	 provisions	 in	 the	major	 areas	 of	
substantive	criminal	law.	This	intention	to	 ‘cover	the	field’	was	an	important	dimension	of	the	
MCC	as	a	criminal	law	reform	project:	if	the	MCC	was	to	provide	the	centripetal	force	in	criminal	
law	 its	 drafters	 anticipated	 at	 the	 time	 it	 was	 created,	 it	 would	 have	 to	 be	 extensive	 if	 not	
exhaustive	in	its	coverage	of	the	law.	As	the	Code	Committee	stated	confidently,	 ‘the	Code	will	
eventually	provide	model	provisions	capable	of	replacing	all	common	law	offences	and	Crimes	
Act	provisions	in	the	common	law	jurisdictions,	and	the	Criminal	Code	provisions	in	the	Griffith	
Code	jurisdictions’	(Code	Committee	1992:	3).		
	
Understanding	the	significance	of	criminal	responsibility	in	the	MCC	
As	discussed	in	the	previous	section,	the	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	were	central	to	the	
reform	 effort	 embodied	 by	 the	 MCC.	 How	 are	 we	 to	 understand	 the	 significance	 of	 criminal	
responsibility	principles	in	the	MCC?	Taking	into	account	what	I	identify	as	three	dimensions	of	
the	MCC	as	a	law	reform	project,	I	suggest	that	criminal	responsibility	provided	formal	coherence	
in	the	MCC,	but	that	this	coherence	was	realised	on	a	conceptual	level.	By	this,	I	mean	that	criminal	
responsibility	 principles	 realised	 linguistic	 uniformity,	 representing	 a	 common	 conceptual	
language	for	criminal	law	and	criminal	lawyers.		
	
On	a	general	level,	the	MCC	is	an	instance	of	modern	criminal	law,	and	this	affects	the	significance	
of	criminal	responsibility	in	the	MCC.	Criminal	responsibility	occupies	a	cardinal	place	not	only	in	
the	MCC—and,	as	discussed	above,	was	central	to	the	modernisation	that	the	MCC	embodied—
but	 also	 in	 modern	 criminal	 law.	 As	 Lacey	 argues,	 individual	 responsibility	 for	 crime	 is	 the	
lynchpin	of	 the	modern	criminal	 law	(Lacey	2001).	As	critical	 criminal	 responsibility	scholars	
suggest,	this	has	several	effects.	As	Farmer	(2016)	argues,	responsibility	(alongside	jurisdiction	
and	codification)	is	thought	to	be	central	to	the	conceptual	order	and	the	self‐understanding	of	
the	criminal	 law	in	the	modern	period.	 In	the	modern	era,	 the	ascription	of	responsibility	has	
become	‘a	technical‐legal	question,	a	matter	of	positive	law’	(Farmer	1997:	159);	that	is,	a	matter	
internal	to	the	law	itself.	Criminal	responsibility	has	also	been	used	as	a	means	of	defining	legal	
personhood:	the	issue	of	who	is	the	proper	subject	of	the	law	(Farmer	2016).	Thus,	orienting	the	
MCC	around	criminal	responsibility	places	the	responsible	subject	at	the	centre	of	the	MCC,	and	
of	the	criminal	law.	With	a	juridical	model	of	the	responsible	person—the	individual,	reasoning	
subject	(Farmer	2016)—at	its	heart,	criminal	law	becomes	a	plank	of	the	modern	political	and	
legal	order,	in	which	individuals	are	held	to	account	for	their	conduct	and	for	creating	risk,	and	
where	law	is	oriented	to	the	goal	of	securing	civil	order	(Farmer	2016).		
	
In	addition,	on	a	specific	 level,	arguably	because	the	precise	 idea	of	codification	informing	the	
development	of	the	MCC	was	not	fully	worked	out,	the	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	were	
required	to	bear	the	weight	of	the	task	of	marking	the	intended	transition	to	modern	Australian	
criminal	law.	As	mentioned	above,	Chapter	2	was	intended	to	‘codify’	the	principles	of	criminal	
responsibility	 (Model	Criminal	Code	 s	 101),	 and	 to	 present	 a	 definitive	 adjudication	 between	
subjective	and	objective	fault	in	criminal	law,	and	between	the	common	law	states’	and	the	code	
states’	approach	to	criminal	responsibility.	As	I	suggested,	the	idea	of	codification	informing	the	
MCC	reduced	to	a	rather	nebulous	idea	of	‘ideal	law’	and	super	legislation,	and	this	left	criminal	
responsibility	to	draw	a	line	between	the	criminal	law	past,	on	the	one	side,	and	the	present	and	
future,	on	the	other	side.	As	Farmer	writes,	codes	allow	for	the	‘logical	control	of	coherence,	the	
replacement	 of	 diachronic	 by	 synchronic	 logic’	 (2014:	 382).	 The	 statement	 of	 principles	 of	
criminal	responsibility	 in	Chapter	2	of	the	MCC	resets	the	clock:	going	forward,	 it	 is	to	be	this	
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(exhaustive)	 statement	 of	 criminal	 responsibility	 which	 is	 to	 underpin	 the	 exposition	 of	 the	
criminal	law	in	the	MCC	and	the	terrain	of	criminal	law	as	a	whole.		
	
Further,	as	mentioned	above,	the	MCC	did	not	contain	any	general	interpretation	provisions,	and	
this	 amplifies	 the	 significance	 of	 criminal	 responsibility	 in	 the	 MCC.	 Without	 general	
interpretation	provisions—and	against	a	wider	national	background	marked	by	the	absence	of	
formally	entrenched	rights	protections	in	Australia—it	is	the	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	
that	 are	 presented	 in	 the	MCC	 as	 necessary	 and	 sufficient	 guides	 to	 parliament	 in	 its	 task	 of	
drafting	criminal	offences.	This	role	for	the	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	in	part	reflects	
that,	by	the	1990s,	criminal	statutory	interpretation	had	come	to	entail	interpretation	consistent	
with	‘the	general	part’	of	criminal	law,	not	just	with	principles	of	statutory	interpretation	such	as	
strict	construction	(Ashworth	1991),	a	point	illustrated	by	the	influential	decision	of	He	Kaw	Teh	
((1985)	 157	 CLR	 523)	 referred	 to	 above.	 It	 is	 the	 principles	 of	 criminal	 responsibility	 that	
structure	and	order	the	law	to	promote	internal	coherence.	In	the	MCC,	criminal	responsibility	is	
the	chief	element	of	the	internal	coherence	of	the	MCC;	that	is,	criminal	responsibility	is	the	main	
way	in	which	the	MCC	measures	itself	against	itself.		
	
These	three	dimensions	of	the	MCC	as	a	law	reform	project	taking	place	in	a	particular	time	and	
place—at	the	general	level,	as	an	instance	of	modern	law,	and,	more	specifically,	as	a	project	of	
codification	 unsupported	 by	 a	 thoroughly	 worked	 out	 idea	 of	 codification	 or	 general	
interpretation	 provisions—come	 together	 to	 a	 single	 point.	 The	 significance	 of	 criminal	
responsibility	 in	 the	 MCC	 is	 that	 it	 realised	 conceptual	 coherence:	 the	 general	 principles	 of	
criminal	 responsibility	 in	 the	MCC	offer	 linguistic	 uniformity;	 that	 is,	 they	provide	 a	 common	
conceptual	 language	 for	 criminal	 law	and	criminal	 lawyers.	While	 the	MCC	was	 trumpeted	as	
bringing	about	consensus	among	criminal	law	experts	from	each	jurisdiction	on	the	principles	of	
criminal	responsibility	and	model	offence,	defence	and	procedure	provisions	(Howie	1996;	Rose	
1995),	this	consensus	revolved	around	the	‘terms	of	the	debate’—the	way	in	which	the	criminal	
law	is	thought	about,	organised	and	reformed—and	this	centred	on	criminal	responsibility.	The	
MCC	achieved	a	conceptual	shift	in	the	way	in	which	the	criminal	law	was	to	be	understood,	with	
criminal	responsibility	at	the	core	of	the	criminal	law,	and	subjective	fault	at	the	core	of	criminal	
responsibility.		
	
It	is	as	a	language	for	understanding	the	criminal	law	that	criminal	responsibility	is	significant.	
As	Goode	(1991a:	45)	writes	in	relation	to	the	MCC,	consistency	in	the	criminal	law	demands	that	
‘even	 if	 the	various	 jurisdictions	agree	 to	disagree,	 at	 least	 they	should	be	 speaking	 the	 same	
language’.	So,	as	Goode	goes	on	to	state,	even	if	Australian	 jurisdictions	might	disagree	on	the	
basis	 for	criminal	 fault,	 the	 inclusion	of	default	 fault	elements	will	mean	they	(the	 legislature)	
have	to	say	so	(Goode	1991a:	45).	It	is	this	act	of	‘saying	so’	that	is	crucial:	disagreement	must	be	
stated.	The	ways	in	which	the	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	control	and	order	meaning	on	
a	 conceptual	 level	 is	 their	 achievement	 in	 the	MCC.	 As	Martin	 Kayman	 argues	 in	 relation	 to	
Bentham’s	linguistic	theory	and	practice,	Bentham	relies	on	a	‘mutual	identity	between	the	law	
of	language	and	the	language	of	law’	(2004:	218).	Similarly,	here,	it	is	not	just	that	enacting	the	
general	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	in	the	MCC	was	‘an	expression	of	confidence	in	the	
aim	of	uniformity’,	as	stated	by	the	Minister	for	Justice	(Kerr	1995:	1359),	but,	rather,	that	this	
expression	constitutes	that	uniformity.	
	
One	of	the	implications	of	this	analysis	of	the	conceptual	significance	of	criminal	responsibility	in	
the	MCC	relates	to	a	critique	often	made	of	Chapter	2.	This	critique	concerns	the	default	status	of	
the	principles	of	criminal	responsibility.	Although	the	Code	Committee	subscribed	to	a	belief	in	
the	 foundational	 nature	 of	 the	 MCC’s	 principles	 of	 criminal	 responsibility,	 and	 stated	 that	
parliament	should	not	make	a	decision	to	override	them	lightly	(Code	Committee	1992),	there	
was	 nothing	 in	 the	MCC	 to	 prevent	 this	 occurring.	 Further,	 there	 are	 no	 principles	 to	 ensure	
consistent	decision‐making,	or	 to	outline	priority	between	principles	(Bronitt	and	Gani	2009).	
Indeed,	the	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	contained	in	the	MCC	apply	only	in	the	event	that	
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parliament	 is	unclear	 in	 its	 intentions	regarding	new	criminal	offences	(Leader‐Elliott	2009a).	
This	means	that	the	‘fundamental’	principles	of	criminal	responsibility	are	merely	default	fault	
principles,	unable	to	exert	any	real	limiting	pressure	on	the	legislature.12	This	leads	Leader‐Elliott	
to	 conclude	 that	 Chapter	 2	 provides	 the	 legislature	with	 a	 ‘set	 of	 instructions	 for	 subverting	
common	law	principles’	of	criminal	responsibility	(Leader‐Elliott	2006:	401,	2009a:	232).	But,	
according	 to	my	analysis,	what	 is	vital	 to	appreciate	 is	 that,	 as	a	 ‘set	of	 instructions’,	 criminal	
responsibility	 represents	 both	 what	 should	 be	 done	 and	 how	 it	 might	 be	 subverted;	 in	 the	
observance	or	the	breach,	criminal	responsibility	governs	the	way	in	which	the	criminal	law	is	
understood.	
	
Conclusion	
The	enactment	of	a	modified	version	of	the	MCC	as	The	Commonwealth	Criminal	Code	was	said	to	
herald	 a	 ‘new	 era’	 not	 just	 for	 Commonwealth	 law	 but	 also	 for	 the	 criminal	 law	 of	 Australia	
generally	 (Crowley	 1994:	 2382).	 The	 MCC—the	 content	 of	 which	 had	 been	 so	 thoroughly	
discussed	at	state	and	Commonwealth	level	in	the	drafting	process	that	the	Bill	was	considered	
‘remarkably	uncontentious’	(Williams	1995:	1348)—facilitated	cooperation	between	the	states	
and	territories	and	the	Commonwealth.	Under	the	auspices	of	the	unique	law	reform	body,	the	
Code	Committee,	 the	Commonwealth	was	able	to	act	as	a	 leader	 in	criminal	 justice	which	had	
been	exclusively	a	field	of	state	power,	and	individual	states	were	left	free	to	legislate	to	adopt	
the	provisions	of	 the	MCC	as	enacted.	 In	Commonwealth	parliamentary	debates,	 the	MCC	was	
considered	 a	 ‘landmark	 in	 cooperative	 federalism’	 (Williams	 1995:	 1349),	 as	 well	 as	 a	
demonstration	 that	 Federalism	 works,	 and	 a	 ‘fitting	 project’	 with	 which	 to	 mark	 the	 then	
forthcoming	centenary	of	Australian	Federation,	 in	2001	(Crowley	1994:	2380).	 In	what,	with	
hindsight,	 seems	overly	optimistic	or	perhaps	naive,	 there	was	even	a	 suggestion	 that	 raising	
crime	to	the	national	stage	and	encasing	it	in	The	Commonwealth	Criminal	Code	would	immunise	
it	from	media	sensationalism	and	populist	concerns,	thereby	reducing	pressure	on	politicians	and	
permitting	 ‘more	 rational	 debate’	 on	 criminal	 justice	 policy	 than	 that	 allowed	 at	 a	 local	 level	
(Melham	1995:	1343‐1344).	
	
The	‘new	era’	heralded	by	the	enactment	of	the	version	of	the	MCC	has	not	yet	arrived.	In	general,	
the	MCC	has	become	a	 reference	point	 rather	 than	 the	benchmark	 for	 criminal	 law	 reform	 in	
Australia,	although	it	did	not	even	serve	as	a	reference	point	(at	least	expressly)	in	the	proposed	
reform	of	the	Queensland	Criminal	Code	in	the	mid‐1990s	(Kift	1997).	While	The	Commonwealth	
Criminal	Code	has	been	altered	and	expanded—most	profoundly,	via	rewriting	and	expansion	of	
terrorism	provisions	(Goode	2011)—its	take	up	rate	has	disappointed	its	drafters	(Goode	2004).	
Only	the	Australian	Capital	Territory	and	Northern	Territory	have	adopted	Chapter	2	(in	2002	
and	2006,	respectively)	(Leader‐Elliott	2002:	29).	Some	sets	of	provisions,	such	as	those	relating	
to	self‐defence,	have	been	adopted	by	some	states,	such	as	NSW	(Gani	2005b).	This	approach	has	
been	referred	to	as	‘picking	the	eyes	out’	of	the	Code	(Griffin	2002‐2003:	265).	Parts	of	the	MCC	
have	been	 subject	 to	 sustained	 criticism	 (Leader‐Elliott	 2009a)	 and,	 in	 some	 instances,	 it	 has	
served	as	a	counterpoint	to	state‐based	initiatives.13	Although	it	has	been	said	that	the	success	of	
the	 MCC	 should	 be	 measured	 in	 decades	 rather	 than	 years	 (Goode	 2002),	 if	 current	 trends	
continue,	the	MCC	is	not	likely	to	be	labelled	a	success.		
	
While	the	perceived	‘failure’	of	the	Code	is	commonly	put	down	to	lack	of	political	will	or	inertia	
(Goode	 2011;	 Griffin	 2002‐2003),	 or	 the	 absence	 of	 commitment	 by	 government	 to	 regular	
revision	and	parliamentary	machinery	to	enable	review	and	amendment	(Leader‐Elliott	2009a),	
arguably,	an	equally	crucial	factor	has	been	a	more	nebulous	one:	the	loss	of	faith	in	the	idea	of	
the	criminal	law	as	a	whole,	and	in	belief	in	the	value	and	possibility	of	systematising	criminal	
law.	In	the	years	since	1995,	both	state	and	Commonwealth	criminal	law	has	grown	significantly	
(Brown	2015),	and	politicisation	of	 the	criminal	 law	and	criminal	 justice	policy	at	all	 levels	of	
government	has	only	amplified.	The	idea	that	one	code	might	encapsulate	it	all	and	serve	as	a	
model	for	each	Australian	jurisdiction	seems	somewhat	Utopian.	Beyond	this,	it	is	not	clear	that	
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the	 principles	 of	 criminal	 responsibility	 are	 capable	 of	 carrying	 the	 burden	 of	 providing	
coherence	in	the	criminal	law,	a	terrain	now	marked	by	a	multiplicity	of	modes	of	criminalisation	
(McNamara	2015).	These	have	had	the	effect	of	further	fragmenting	a	fragmented	landscape	or,	
perhaps,	of	creating	entirely	new	landscapes.	
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1	 I	 thank	Umeya	Chaudhuri,	Natalie	Czapski,	Mikah	Pajaczkowska‐Russell	and	Louisa	Vaupel	 for	excellent	 research	
assistance.	My	research	on	criminal	responsibility	 is	supported	by	ARC	grant,	Responsibility	 in	Criminal	Law	 (No.	
DE130100418).	
2	The	Committee	was	initially	called	the	Criminal	Law	Officers	Committee	(CLOC)	but,	from	1993,	it	was	known	as	the	
Model	Criminal	Code	Officers	Committee	(MCCOC)	and,	later,	the	Model	Criminal	Law	Officers	Committee	(MCLOC).	
In	this	paper,	I	refer	to	the	‘Code	Committee’	for	simplicity.	
3	The	criminal	codes	of	Queensland	(Criminal	Code	Act	1899),	Western	Australia	(Criminal	Code	Act	Compilation	Act	
1913)	and	Tasmania	(Criminal	Code	Act1924)	were	developed	at	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	and	early	part	of	
the	twentieth	century.	The	criminal	codes	of	the	Northern	Territory	(NT)	and	Australian	Capital	Territory	(ACT)	were	
developed	later	but	are	modelled	on	the	earlier	codes	(the	NT	law	is	now	modelled	on	The	Commonwealth	Criminal	
Code	and	the	ACT	has	incorporated	Chapter	2	of	the	MCC).		
4	 In	the	Australian	political	system,	drafting	offences	is	a	bureaucratic	exercise:	 legislation	only	reaches	parliament	
after	public	servants	operating	under	ministerial	guidance	have	drafted	it	(Bronitt	and	Gani	2009:	246‐247).		
5	As	it	stands,	Chapter	1	comprises	just	one	clause,	on	codification	(Model	Criminal	Code	s	101),	which	was	intended	to	
indicate	the	scope	of	the	MCC	and	explain	the	location	of	the	chapter	on	criminal	responsibility	(Code	Committee	
1992;	Gani	2005b).	
6	It	has	been	suggested	that	a	practitioner	manual—the	Guide	to	Framing	Commonwealth	Offences,	Civil	Penalties	and	
Enforcement	Powers	(Leader‐Elliot	2009b)—should	be	cast	into	legislative	form	in	order	to	aid	interpretation	of	the	
MCC.	As	it	is,	the	principles	governing	interpretation	of	the	Code	have	been	judicially‐developed	(Bronitt	and	Gani	
2009).	
7	Under	Chief	 Justice	Anthony	Mason,	the	Australian	High	Court	moved	from	‘legalism’	to	 ‘realism’	in	constitutional	
interpretation,	 and	 the	native	 title	 decisions	 of	Mabo	 (and	 later	Wik),	 and	 the	 development	 of	 an	 implied	 rights	
jurisprudence,	enhanced	the	political	profile	of	the	High	Court	(Hall	2000:	147‐149,	150‐151).	
8	Dietrich	concerned	access	to	legal	representation	when	an	accused	is	charged	with	a	serious	offence	and	where	the	
absence	of	such	representation	compromises	the	right	to	a	fair	trial;	see	also	Toonen	v	Australia	Communication	No.	
488/1992	(concerning	rights	to	privacy	and	non‐discrimination	that	were	infringed	by	Tasmanian	laws	criminalizing	
sex	between	men).	
9	 The	 MCC	 provisions	 on	 intoxication	 were	 based	 on	 the	 High	 Court’s	 decision	 in	 O’Connor,	 allowing	 voluntary	
intoxication	to	cast	doubt	on	whether	the	accused	had	formed	the	requisite	intent	in	relation	to	any	offence	(Code	
Committee	1992:	 49‐51;	R	v	O’Connor	 (1980)	146	CLR	64).	When	 it	 came	 to	 enacting	 the	draft	 code	provisions,	
parliament	sought	a	more	pragmatic	approach	and	opted	for	the	dominant	common	law	approach,	which	had	been	
set	out	by	the	House	of	Lords	in	Majewski	in	1977	(DPP	v	Majewski	[1977]	AC	443),	and	which	restricts	the	cases	in	
which	voluntary	intoxication	can	be	raised	by	the	defence	to	a	subset	of	cases:	those	in	which	the	accused	is	charged	
with	an	offence	of	‘specific	intent’.	
10The	Code	Committee	produced	eight	reports	 in	total,	each	of	which	included	draft	 legislation.	After	the	report	on	
general	 principles	 of	 criminal	 responsibility,	 these	 reports	 covered:	 theft,	 fraud	 and	 related	 offences	 (1995);	
blackmail,	 forgery	and	bribery;	non‐fatal	offences	against	the	person	(1994);	sexual	offences	(which	also	covered	
some	evidentiary	and	procedural	 issues,	and	age	of	consent)	 (1996);	conspiracy	 to	defraud	(1997);	serious	drug	
offences	(1998);	offences	against	the	administration	of	justice;	and	public	order	offences	(1998).	
11The	Code	Committee	‘ran	out	of	time	and	resources’	on	homicide	(Goode	2004:	229).	
12This	has	been	borne	out	by	the	subsequent	development,	in	2002	and	the	years	since	then,	of	a	raft	of	Commonwealth	
terrorism	offences,	which	bear	little	connection	to	the	subjective	fault	standard	enshrined	in	the	MCC	(Bronitt	and	
Gani	2009).	
13An	example	is	the	recommendation	that	psychopathy/severe	personality	disorder	be	excluded	from	the	bounds	of	
the	mental	impairment	defence	in	NSW	(NSW	Law	Reform	Commission	2013	[3.37]‐[3.40]).		
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